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China 9475
 AMERICAN EMBASSY
 Office of the Naval Attache
 Chungking.

October 13, 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Your very kind letter of August 28th reached me on the morning of October 7th just as I was leaving with the Willkie party for a trip to the war front near SIAM and I had no time to send an answer along with them. You will have received via them, however, my letter to Captain Zacharias about remaining on out here if it is so desired. I sincerely hope, however, that I may be permitted to come home for a short time.

I enclose a copy of another report which is self-explanatory. I realize that to speak as bluntly as I have done in this report may be considered a violation of service etiquette, but it seems to me that the time has come for such frankness and that it is my duty as an observer to report the facts as I see them irrespective of whose toes get trod upon. We are never going to win this war by pussyfooting.

General Chennault "draws a pretty long bow" in his claims as to what he can accomplish, but I personally believe he can come very close to achieving all he claims, if he receives regular supplies and whole-hearted support. I am firmly convinced that the tactics now being employed against him are designed to squeeze him out sooner or later, yet not a one of his opponents could have come within a mile of organizing and leading the A.V.G. in the way he did. The very organization and control of that group was an outstanding tribute to his qualities of leadership, for he had no service loss and regulations to fall back upon.

I trust I shall have the opportunity of seeing you personally in the near future. I appreciate very deeply the confidence and trust you have imposed in me.

Respectfully

/s/ J. H. Hooten
 Lt. Colonel, USAF

Naval Attache and Naval Attache
 for Air

The Honorable
 Frank Knox
 Secretary of the Navy
 Washington

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

SECRET**INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

Serial 1042 Monograph Index Guide No. _____
(To correspond with SUBJECTIVE given below. See U. S. I. Index Guide.)
(Make separate report for each main title.)

From Special Attache at Shanghai Date 11 October, 1942
(Also, last, with, division, date, edition, or version.)

Reference Estimate of Japanese Situation in China, Report #2/42 of
(Classification, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable.) SECRET

Source Gen. C. L. Chennault, A.U.S., and Evaluation Making "A"
(As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject CHINA
(Division reported on) (Main title as per Index Guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

NOTE: (When more careful summary of report, containing substance completely stated, include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

SUMMARY OF SITUATION IN CHINA DATA 1 OCTOBER, 1942

There is forwarded herewith as Enclosure "A" a copy of a letter addressed to The Honorable Wendell Willkie by Brigadier General C. L. Chennault, A.U.S., dated 8 October, 1942, which was prepared for Mr. Willkie at his request during his recent visit to Shanghai after a conference with General Chennault. Due to a last minute change in departure the report did not reach Mr. Willkie in time and is being forwarded by the same mail which brings this report.

This letter explains at first hand and in much greater detail the argument which I advanced on page 5 of the report under reference for an immediate air offensive against Japan in China. It will be noted in fact that General Chennault asks for an even smaller air force than I advocated, namely, 109 fighters of modern design, 30 medium bombers and, in the last phase some months from now, 12 heavy bombers. He furthermore states that he can supply the above forces with only 30 transports of the C-47 type now in use. His estimated requirements are appended in detail to his letter.

Because I believe his plan to be thoroughly practicable and furthermore am convinced that it is absolutely essential for us to take the offensive now in this theater, I am going to discuss it in plain language. I am going to call a spade a spade in this report and name individuals. I consider that my position as an independent observer from a different branch of the service entitles me to do so.

There to whom General Chennault's plan may appeal (and I believe a decided majority will agree that it is worth trying) will at once ask, "why then doesn't General Stilwell put it into operation?" It is a fair question. I have not even understood

-1-

Enclosure: 1 copy

Serial 1042

SECRET

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Office of the Naval Attache
Cebu City

October 13, 1942

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I enclose a copy of another report which is self-explanatory. I realize that to speak as bluntly as I have done in this report may be considered a violation of service etiquette, but it seems to me that the time has come for such frankness and that it is my duty as an observer to report the facts as I see them irrespective of whose toes get trod upon. We are never going to win this war by pussyfooting.

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Respectfully
/s/ J. M. McHugh
Lt. Colonel, USMC
Naval Attache and Naval Attache
for Air

The Honorable
Frank B. Row
Secretary of the Navy
Washington

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

SECRET**INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

Serial 1242 Monograph Index Guide No. _____
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below, see G. N. I. Index Guide.
Make separate report for each title title.)

From General Chennault at Shanghai Date 11 October, 1942

Reference Excerpts of Japanese Situation in China, Report #2/42 of
1242

Source Gen. C. L. Chennault, A.U.S., and Evaluation Rating "A"
(As reliable, detailed, uncovered, etc.)

Subject China
(When reported on) (When title is per Index Guide) (Citation) (Make separate report for each title)

NOTE:—When other useful summary of report, containing substance materially stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

EXCERPTS OF JAPANESE SITUATION IN CHINA DATED 5 OCTOBER, 1942

There is forwarded herewith as Enclosure "A" a copy of a letter addressed to The Honorable Wendell Willkie by Brigadier General C. L. Chennault, A.U.S., dated 5 October, 1942, which was prepared for Mr. Willkie at his request during his recent visit to Shanghai after a conference with General Chennault. Due to a last minute change in departure the report did not reach Mr. Willkie in time and is being forwarded by the same mail which brings this report.

This letter explains at first hand and in much greater detail the argument which I advanced on page 5 of the report under reference for an immediate air offensive against Japan in China. It will be noted in fact that General Chennault asks for an even smaller air force than I advocated, namely, 103 fighters of modern design, 30 medium bombers and, in the last phase some months from now, 12 heavy bombers. He furthermore states that he can supply the above forces with only 30 transports of the C-47 type now in use. His estimated requirements are appended in detail to his letter.

Because I believe his plan to be thoroughly practicable and furthermore am convinced that it is absolutely essential for us to take the offensive now in this theater, I am going to discuss it in plain language. I am going to call a spade a spade in this report and name individuals. I consider that my position as an independent observer from a different branch of the service entitles me to do so.

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Revised by: Chennault

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until I obtained an explanation from a reliable third party as to what I should expect of October 24th. That individual, who had just recently conversed with General Stilwell on the subject, quoted him directly as stating that his main objection to any increase of the air force in China was based on his belief that such increase as is practicable and desirable "could still be so small as to mean nothing in the general picture of the conduct of this war". General Stilwell understands such an increase only in terms of air power in the Chinese theater and added, "what is even a small increase for a Chinese army of several million men?" In other words he does not even visualize the Japanese land forces as being in danger by the force advocated by General Stilwell. It is already well known that during July 1942 the Japanese had already been demonstrated during July 1942 that the limitations of present stocks of gasoline plus restricted transport make it wholly impossible to consider offensive air operations until such time as a land route can be reopened.

These air officers, incidentally, have been trained in the "Flying Fortresses" school. They think in terms of nothing else. General Bratt arrived in Burma and Chungking last December talking of nothing but four motorized planes. He was followed by General Brady who had rushed away from the M.M.I. to India looking for a place where he could park the few remaining fortresses which had been caught flat-footed on the ground without protection of either warning net or fighters in the Philippines on the day war opened and had been on the run ever since. General Brady was followed quickly by Generals Brewster and Haiden who, despite clear cut instructions to open and maintain a ferry route across India to China as their main objective, established themselves comfortably in a modern, air-conditioned hotel in New Delhi with female stenographers and began to stage sporadic raids into Burma and the Bay of Bengal with their few remaining fortresses to the tune of much publicity. They gave General Stilwell neither air support nor reconnaissance, incidentally, during the Battle of Burma. None of them ever indicated that he understood or appreciated the basic principle of air strategy long advocated by General Stilwell that one must first establish bases as far forward as possible protected by fighters and a warning and reporting net and take the war to the enemy from these bases. Yet General Stilwell was demonstrating this very thing right under their noses with his A.V.G., protecting Rangoon, Toungoo and Lashio and bombing and strafing the Japs in Thailand and Indochina! The Ferry Route to China, incidentally, was left largely to its own devices under the immediate control of combat pilots who possessed little if any experience in transport and supply organization and problems - this furthermore despite the availability of A. L. Mond and his China National Aviation Corporation who possessed both the experience and ability and could easily have been used as a nucleus for expansion to any proportions. The Army instead went into competition with C.N.A.C. and are now trying to cheat them through the device of chartering their capacity.

This condition obtained until early in July when, General Brewster having been transferred to Cairo and the

confusion in the 10th U. S. Air Force at New Delhi having become so notorious as to demand action, General Stilwell relieved Brigadier General Haiden and appointed his own air staff officer, Brigadier General Bissell to the job. The Chinese, who had been hoping that Chennault would be given complete control of air operations and who in the meantime had developed an active dislike of General Bissell, regarded this as a direct kick in the teeth. General Bissell had arrived in China in March along with General Stilwell, but it was soon apparent that he was General Arnold's man and that there were two parallel and almost independent lines of action - General Marshall to General Stilwell and General Arnold to General Bissell. General Stilwell exhibited a strong reticence from the first to interfere with or dictate to his air officers. General Bissell set out immediately to force through the induction of the A.V.O. which had first been proposed in December. He dealt directly with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang on the subject and forced the issue on the argument that the A.V.O. could not hope to survive and obtain replacements in men and material as a mercenary organization while if it were inducted into the U. S. Army Air Force, he would see that it was well supplied. The Generalissimo acquiesced reluctantly, but with the proviso that Chennault should have control of operations in China. Chennault was promoted to Brigadier General and by a curious coincidence (?) his name went through just one number junior to that of General Bissell. This was no doubt due to the alphabetical arrangement of the list of nominees!

The induction was set for July 15th - a period which had in previous years been the height of the bombing season and with the morale of the Chinese already shaken over the loss of Burma. The great majority of the A.V.O. quit in disgust and with this apparent I personally interceded with General Stilwell to postpone the date and appeal to the A.V.O. to renew their contracts until the Fall. He finally extended it at the last moment to July 15th, but the damage was already done and most of the A.V.O. departed leaving an inexperienced group of new Army pilots to take over. Fortunately the Japs kept away and toward the end of the month Chennault had managed to seed out several more promising Army pilots which he combined with the few A.V.O. remaining to stage his successful front line air offensives against Kwang, Kweichow and Canton during August.

In the meantime the change in command at New Delhi had occurred and Chennault found himself titularly in command of the "China Air Task Force", but administratively under General Bissell in New Delhi and with specific orders to cease any direct dealings with the Chinese, but instead to deal through the chain of command - namely to Bissell over in India, back to Stilwell and then to the Generalissimo, or, to Stilwell, then to Bissell, back to Stilwell and then to Chennault before any move however small can be taken. He has, in other words, only local tactical command. He has no control over his supplies or replacements and must submit all strategic plans as well as administrative questions through the chain of command. This is not what was promised the Generalissimo and I learned directly from him when I lunched alone with him and Madame Chiang on October 9th that he is exceedingly annoyed by it. He wants the India command

completely separated from the China command and he wants General Chennault in full control. He is very skeptical of receiving any of the planes now earmarked for the 10th Air Force to which I referred in my report of July 5th.

General Chennault informs me, incidentally, that the 10th Air Force is now bringing its 1st Fighter Group in India up to full strength (34 planes), that they plan to organize a second fighter group there and a medium bomber group of 40 B-25's plus the six B-24's and fifteen B-17's which they already have. He has also just learned that the British now have in India fifteen squadrons of fighters of 16 planes each - this apparently for the defense of India against a very problematical Japanese attack as opposed to the plan which Chennault advances for attacking the Japs now in China and making sure they never get to India! The excuse is that they are going to protect the India-China ferry route. This is sound as far as it goes, but it should be subordinated in my opinion with Chennault's program in China, placed under his full control and definitely divorced from the protection of India proper. That is General Stilwell's job. It brings up the question of General Stilwell's plans.

General Stilwell wants to recapture Burma and the above concentration of the 10th Air Force is related also to this. This is an understandable and pardonable ambition! He got kicked out of there in a very rude and unceremonious fashion. After all blame is laid and excuses made the fact remains that he permitted the Japs to draw him clear over to his right flank when he admittedly did not know of their rapid approach to his left flank and thereby not only was out-flanked, but actually cut off from his main line of withdrawal. He can argue and explain it until doomsday, but to get cut off from the rear has always been and always will be an unpardonable violation of the basic rules of military strategy. The subsequent retreat of himself and staff together with part of the Chinese forces into Assam was a flight - not a withdrawal or even a retreat.

I stated in my previous report that I do not consider the employment of American troops practicable in a campaign to recapture Burma. I happen to know that General Stilwell has asked for three divisions and that he considers this reasonable since it constituted only a small fraction of the force we are now training. But as I commented previously, the shipping required to deliver and to maintain three divisions would constitute a much larger fraction of our total. Ultimately it would be very difficult. But most of all, and a point I did not mention previously, is the political angle. The British do not want either us or the Chinese participating in the recapture of Burma. They are afraid they would not get it back and there is no denying that the Chinese want both the oil and rice of Burma. General Stilwell is now training Chinese troops in India - the 10th Division and part of the 9th Division which finally struggled there from Burma. The excuse is plausible; they cannot bring them back to China; the heavy-load artillery and ammunition is on hand in India and likewise cannot be brought into China by air; so they can shoot and train to their heart's content in India and then take part in the recapture of Burma. Orders have just been issued, in fact, by General Stilwell's headquarters in Chungking that all export

of essential war materials such as tin and tungsten from China will be held in abeyance until further orders pending the transfer to India of more Chinese troops.

I doubt seriously if the British would really cooperate in a joint Sino-American-British campaign to recapture Burma. The Chinese, on the other hand, are enthusiastic about it and not alone to reopen the supply route to China. They intend to stay in Burma if they can for reasons given above and to control their backdoor route all the way to the sea. They also like the Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" only they see themselves as the leaders instead of the Japanese. The British have long known and feared this and stalled the completion of their part of the Burma Road as long as they could to discourage it. They likewise stalled the defense of Burma proper and declined the initial offer of Chinese troops for the same reason. They never anticipated that the Japanese would overrun it so fast.

I consider therefore that the present plans for the recapture of Burma and the accompanying dissipation of American Air Strength there to be essentially fallacious as opposed to its effective employment in the manner which General Chennault outlines. Let it be remembered that the Japanese take out from 10,000 to 14,000 tons daily of high grade coal alone from the Mongyai mines north of Hailphong and that these ships can be sunk by air operations from fields still in the possession of the Chinese. They also ship 200,000 tons of rice per season north. Let it also be remembered that the harbor of Hongkong is teeming with shipping. (A recent reconnaissance by Chennault proved this.) The destruction of Japanese shipping will do more to bring this war to a close than any other one factor. A well directed bombing attack on the power plants of the Kailan mines at Tungshan, North of Tientsin, would put the mines out of action through flooding for at least a year and deprive the Japanese of over fifty percent (some say seventy-five) of their total supply of coking coal. I have personally obtained and given to Chennault a complete set of maps for this operation. He as yet has no planes with sufficient range for the job - yet the 10th Air Force has six B-24's and fifteen B-17's sitting down there doing comparatively little!

I firmly believe - and I report this without the slightest personal rancor or feeling, that the war in this theater would be materially aided by the removal of both Generals Stilwell and Hensell and their huge staffs. These staffs alone are an object of amazement in the amount of paper work they engage in every day with so little real action resulting. They make their own work and I firmly believe they would be just as busy if they were suddenly transported to Kansas City as they now are here and with no appreciable change in the local situation. Chennault carried the A.V.C. through its entire career with practically no staff at all! The Chinese would be of two minds on the question, I believe. On the one hand they would fear a loss of face and of promised support, but I think this would be overcome if the action were passed to Chennault with tangible evidence of genuine support for him together with the relief

of being rid of the officers each of whom in his own way has irritated and annoyed them. Neither of the two Generals named has the confidence of the Chinese. Chennault, as I have said before, does have it and if we mean what we continually have promised them I believe we should take action accordingly. More than this, I repeat again, I firmly believe we could really begin to do tangible damage to the Japanese and severely compromise their present efforts.

J. M. MAMMAM,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air.

**APPENDIX "A" TO REPORT NO. 10/12 FROM NAVAL ATTACHE, CHUNGKING,
DATED 11 OCTOBER, 1942**

**HEADQUARTERS, CHINA AIR TASK FORCE
Office of the Commanding General**

October 8, 1942.

**Mr. Wendell Willkie,
Special Representative of the President
In his capacity as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces.**

You have stated to me that you are the direct representative in a military as well as a political sense, of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army, the President of the United States. You have ordered me to make a report directly to you on military operations in China against Japan. I herewith comply.

1. Japan can be defeated in China.
2. It can be defeated by an Air Force so small that in other theaters it would be called ridiculous.
3. I am confident that, given real authority in command of such an Air Force, I can cause the collapse of Japan. I believe I can do it in such a manner that the lives of hundred of thousands of American soldiers and sailors will be saved, and that the cost to our country will be relatively small.
4. I speak with confidence, but, I believe, not with egotism. The reason for my confidence is based on the fact that since 1923 I have believed firmly in the possibility of Japan making war on the United States; I have devoted the best years of my military life to the study of this subject; I have for five years been unofficial advisor to the Chinese Air Force; in this capacity, I made war against Japan for over five years; for the last year I have commanded first the A.V.G., then the China Air Task Force; at no time in China have I had as many as fifty fighting planes in operation to meet the full fighting air force of Japan; as Commander of the A.V.G. and the China Air Task Force, I have never lost an air battle against the Japanese. This tiny fighter force under my Command has destroyed over three hundred Japanese aircraft confirmed and about three hundred more probably destroyed - I believe the total to be about six hundred - with the loss of twelve A.V.G. pilots and four China Air Task Force pilots from enemy action. The bomber force of the China Air Task Force has consisted at maximum of eight medium bombers. With these I have made twenty five raids against Japanese installations, troops, and shipping, without the loss of either a man or plane through enemy action.

5. When I came to China the Chinese Air Force was under Italian advisors. Before America entered the war I had succeeded, (because I believed we would fight the Axis powers and Japan), in having the Italians sent out of China. I believe I have the full confidence of the Generalissimo and all high Chinese leaders. If I have their confidence it is because (a) I have been a winning general, (b) I have never lied to the Chinese, and I have never promised to perform more than I believed capable of performance.

6. I am now confident that given full authority as the American military commander in China that I can not only bring about the downfall of Japan but that I can make the Chinese lasting friends with the United States. I am confident that I can create such good will that China will be a great and friendly trade market for generations.

7. The military task is a simple one. It has been complicated by unwieldy, illogical military organization and by men who do not understand aerial warfare in China.

8. To accomplish the downfall of Japan, I need only this very small American Air Force - 105 fighter aircraft of modern design, 30 medium bombers, and in the last phase, some months from now, 12 heavy bombers. The force must be constantly maintained at all times. We will have losses. These losses must be replaced. I consider 30 per cent replacements in fighters and 20 per cent in bombers sufficient.

9. My reason for stating that I can accomplish the overthrow of Japan is that I am confident this force can destroy the effectiveness of the Japanese Air Force, probably within six months, within one year at the outside. I am a professional fighter and this is my professional opinion. The facts on which this opinion is based are simple. Japan has only a limited production of aircraft. I can force that Japanese Air Force by aerial military maneuver to fight me in a position of my own selection. Having once fixed it in this position I can destroy its effectiveness. With its basic effective Air Force destroyed, our Navy can operate with freedom, and General MacArthur can push his offensive in the South West Pacific as will. Meanwhile, from the Eastern Chinese Air Masses, I will guarantee to destroy the principal industrial centers of Japan. No country is so peculiarly vulnerable to air attack. The cutting of the Japanese sea routes to her newly conquered empire is a matter. Once the above two objectives are accomplished, complete military subjection of Japan is certain and

10. To effectively maintain the small air force mentioned above, an aerial supply line must be built between India and China. It is a simple statement compared to say this aerial supply line will also be minute compared to the objectives to be accomplished. The full establishment and maintenance of this aerial ferry route is China's play in comparison with the difficulties overcome in establishing the Pan American Air Line or its Atlantic lines. It only needs good command - good amount of freight to be carried over this route. The maintenance of an air force is very small - the study will state the basic simplicity.

11. The present plan for the defense of this ferry line is that of the standard orthodox, rigid military mind. It shows complete lack of conception of the true use of air power or even of basic military strategy. I would defend this air line in the same way that Scipio Africanus defended Rome, when Hannibal was at its very gates. Scipio struck at Carthage, and the Carthaginians, by necessity, had to call him and his army back to Africa to defend Carthage. In like manner, I would defend the ferry route by striking at the Japanese supply lines to the Southwest Pacific, and then hit Tokyo itself. The Japanese Air Force by necessity would then be forced to fight in eastern China and over Tokyo. The Japanese have not the air power to fight both over the ferry route in India, Burma and Yunnan, and over Tokyo at the same time. No capable commander in history has ever adopted the stolid plan of the now present method considered of defending the ferry route. Grant ordered Sherman to march through the heart of the South and destroy Lee's supplies and cut Lee's lines of communications while, he, Grant, fixed Lee's Army in northern Virginia. Once Lee's supplies and line of communication were cut, Lee was defeated and the Confederacy was ruined. I plan to do the same thing in China against Japan with air power. Japan must hold Hongkong, Shanghai, and the Yangtze Valley. These are essential to hold Japan itself. I can force the Japanese Air Force to fight in the defense of these objectives behind the best air warning net of its kind in the Far East (which warning net I have spent five years in developing). With the use of these tactics, I am confident that I can destroy Japanese aircraft at the rate of between ten to twenty to one. When the Japanese Air Force refuses to come within my warning net and fight, I will strike out with my medium bombers against their sea supply line to the Southwest Pacific. In a few months the enemy will lose so many aircraft that the aerial defense of Japan will be negligible. I can then strike at Japan from Chuchow (Chusan) and Lichai with heavy bombers. My air force can burn up Japan's two main industrial areas - Tokyo and the Kobe, Osaka, Nagoya triangle - and Japan will be unable to supply her armies in her newly conquered empire in China, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, etc. with munitions of war. The road is then open for the Chinese Army in China, for the American Navy in the Pacific and for MacArthur to advance from his Australian stronghold - all with comparatively slight cost.

12. While engaged in these operations, I will maintain full ground installations for the Eastern terminus of the ferry route in Yunnan, at Kunming, Chanyi, Yunnan, etc. If a really major swift aerial movement is made by the Japanese across their staging route into Burma, to attack the India-China air supply lines, then, acting on interior lines of air communications, I can move back and again be within the warning net which I have established in Yunnan, and meet the Japanese over their Burma airfields and then and there destroy whatever force they have sent against us.

My entire above plan is simple. It has been long thought out. I have spent five years developing an air warning net and radio command service to fight this way. I have no doubt of my success.

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13. However, in order to accomplish this aim, it is essential that I be given complete freedom of fighting action, that I also be able to deal directly with the Generalissimo and the Chinese forces. This latter I know the Generalissimo would not make the above statements so confident-ly if I had not, in my operations with the A.V.O., never retreated one foot until the ground forces had fled behind me, leaving up air bases exposed to ground attack. Only then did I retreat to again destroy twenty Japanese planes for each one of the A.V.O. lost. Even then I would not have been forced to retreat if I had had the necessary bombers and reconnaissance planes.

Given authority to report only to the Generalissimo, I intend to carry out in China this combined ground and air action.

14. This plan I again repeat will enable the Chinese ground forces to operate successfully, and must assuredly will permit MacArthur to successfully advance and will decisively aid the Navy's operations in the Pacific. Moreover, it will make China our lasting friend for years after the war.

15. Reference to attached map will clearly indicate operating areas and striking distances of vital Japanese communications from our air bases. Attached is an outline of operations and logistics.

O. L. CHENNAULT
Brigadier General, A.U.S.,
Commanding.

SECRET**HEADQUARTERS, CHINA AIR TASK FORCE****STATE OF THE FORCE****Objectives:**

1. Primary movement of vital supplies by air from Nanking to Haining.
2. Secondary movement of supplies to forward areas by truck and railway.
3. Operations against Chinese Coastal objectives by medium bombers and fighters from bases in the Hangchow-Shanghai area.
4. Improving and conditioning our warning net in forward areas.

Subsistence items for personnel will be obtained in China as far as possible.

Squadrons will be stream lined for field mobility, using to the fullest the Chinese Air Force crews which are available to us for field salvage and routine service and using entirely Chinese services which are established and satisfactory for housing and quartering facilities.

Combat equipment strength:

1. One Single engine Fighter Group plus one Squadron, total 100 airplanes
2. One Medium Bombardment Group consisting of two Squadrons, total 30 airplanes.

Figures based upon past operations in this theater indicate that Fighter Squadron strength should be maintained at 100 officers and men
 Medium Bombardment Squadron strength 100 officers and men
 This will bring the total combat strength of U.S. Forces in China to 212 officers and men
 Service and personnel necessary for operations 200 officers and men
 Total Army personnel in China for this phase of operations 1,000 officers and men.

Operations in this theater indicate that fighter squadrons assigned 20 airplanes at the first of each month can maintain an average of 10 airplanes on the alert each day throughout the month. Medium Bombardment Squadrons assigned 10 airplanes at the beginning of each month can maintain 10 airplanes on the alert each day throughout the month. Over an extended period of time, the plan will require the replacement of bombardment airplanes and 300 replacement of fighter airplanes and reasonable supply of spare parts and maintenance equipment delivered to the operating units for this phase of operations.

Experience indicates that medium field performance will average 20 operating days per month for fighters and 10 operating days per month for medium bombardment airplanes.

SECRET

Average gasoline consumption per fighter is 100 gallons per operating day - total fighter airplane requirements - 144,000 gallons per month. Gasoline requirement medium bombardment airplanes per operating day 100 gallons - total medium bombardment requirements 144,000 gallons monthly. Two transports will be necessary for secondary supply to squadrons operating at advanced bases. These transports will have an average of 20 operating days per month, gasoline consumption of two transports per month estimated at 20,000 gallons - total aviation gasoline consumption China Air Task Force 344,000 gallons monthly.

Total airplane engine oil requirements - 6,000 gallons per month.

Due to weather conditions and tactical considerations, it is barely possible that 20 operating days per month will be maintained throughout the length of time in which operations are contemplated.

Ordnance requirements - 432,000 rounds 30 caliber ammunition per month. At the present time supplies of 30 and 38 caliber ammunition on hand in China will more than meet the requirements of both fighter and bombardment groups.

Ordnance requirements Bombardment Squadrons - 720,000 pounds per month. At the present time adequate bombs are on hand in this area to supply this phase of operation.

Monthly tonnage list of supplies necessary to support first phase of operation:

100 Octane Aviation Fuel	1,014 tons
Air Force Supplies consisting of parts and maintenance materials	20 tons
Motor Vehicle fuel for field operations	60 tons
Special subsistence items and QM items	20 tons
Post Exchange Supplies	4 tons
Chemical Warfare supplies	4 tons
Engineering Corps supplies	2 tons
Signal Supplies	2 tons
Medical Supplies	3 tons
Machine gun ammunition	10 tons
Bombs	30 tons
Miscellaneous ordnance	4 tons
Miscellaneous items	7 tons

Total monthly tonnage 1,200

C-47 type transports can make an estimate of 20 round trips per month carrying two tons cargo each trip. Thirty transports maintained in commission at all times, will be the minimum requirements for air supply of the China Air Task Force.

This plan does not include motor vehicle fuel for secondary movement of supplies from Kuning to rail head of the Szechwan-Chengdu Railway or from this point to more advanced airbases. Fuel for this move is available at this time in China.

SECRET**PHASE "A" - INITIAL PHASE****Objectives:**

1. Maintenance of objectives obtained in Phase "A".
2. Transition from most advanced aircraft with fighters and medium bombardment type aircraft.

Continued weakening of the Japanese Air Force in this area by forcing the Japanese to concentrate on our lines and to most American pursuit over Chinese warning line.

Logistical increases second phase of operations:

Additional supplies	340 tons
Major fuel for secondary transport	100 tons
of supplies	200 tons

Requiring additional transports needed to carry this increased tonnage for second phase of operations.

Supplementing above, India China Supply service will be using medium transports of the C-47 or C-54 types. These airplanes will be used to bring in material for building up bases at most advanced bases for operation of heavy bombers against the island of Japan.

Primary movement of these supplies to be from Dinjan to Hanoi. Secondary movement to forward areas by transporters and trucks in China. If it is impossible to do this because of lack of facilities, primary movement of supplies will be made from Dinjan to airports on the Hanoi-Kunming railway and from this point distributed by rail and by truck to forward airbases.

Logistic figures are based on the assumption that primary material will be maintained at 47 C-47 type and 25 C-54 type with an average of 20 operating days per month during this second phase of operation.

PHASE "B"

1. Continued operations of light bombardment and pursuit as outlined in Phase "A" and Phase "B".
2. Use of the advanced aircraft for operation of heavy bombardment squadrons against Japan. Active pursuit operations over and from advanced bases to protect these installations from Japanese attacks.

Logistics as outlined in Phase "B", supplemented by 25 C-54 type medium transports for initial and secondary bases of heavy bombardment squadrons operating against Japan.

25 C-54 type medium transports for this phase and secondary operations.

**25 C-54 type
25 C-54 type**

SECRET

To adequately supply field units it is necessary
that replacement transports be available to maintain the
same number in commission at all times.

Green

Letter
Sunday

My Dear Bill

Thank you very much for writing and for your
stage estimates reports. I had heard that of them
already, and found each of them to be a good deal
in telling me how pretty high they are in the
lot in what he says.

I am pretty sure that the reason for our
not wanting Chinese colonization is the escape of
Chowmen. The matter is not concerned with the
to our own own stability, then we can handle it
with certainly complete whole heartedly in a few
campaigns to capture Burma and our own place
on that front. We should have it from the main ground in
our effort and, Burma being a British friend of my country,
the strategic control must be held by us. But it is
really going too far to suggest that we should not try to
be satisfied by the Chinese keeping it to themselves
I believe it is quite unlikely that we should be
completion of our part of the Burma road for our own sake.

However, that is all by the way. I should very much
like to see British air forces operating up in China and
probably will be only too glad to see them under the
eyes of Chinamen for whom I have the greatest
sympathy. It is a real war zone. We have and we have
the same in the air. As a matter of fact
the British (or the Chinese) is also very strong.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Office of the Naval Attache
Canton, China

China
Shanghai
Stellwell
McHugh
Lillie

October 13, 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Your very kind letter of August 28th reached me on the morning of October 7th just as I was leaving with the Phillips party for a trip to the war front near SIAM and I had no time to send an answer along with them. You will have received via them, however, my letter to Captain Eastman about remaining on out here if it is so desired. I sincerely hope, however, that I may be permitted to come home for a short time.

I enclose a copy of another report which is self-explanatory. I realize that to speak as bluntly as I have done in this report may be considered a violation of service etiquette, but it seems to me that the time has come for such frankness and that it is my duty as an observer to report the facts as I see them irrespective of whose toes get trod upon. We are never going to win this war by pussyfooting.

General Chennault "draws a pretty long bow" in his claims as to what he can accomplish, but I personally believe he can come very close to achieving all he claims, if he receives regular supplies and whole-hearted support. I am firmly convinced that the tactics now being employed against him are designed to squeeze him out sooner or later, yet not a one of his opponents could have come within a mile of organizing and leading the A.V.G. in the way he did. The very organization and control of that group was an outstanding tribute to his qualities of leadership, for he had no service laws and regulations to fall back upon.

I trust I shall have the opportunity of seeing you personally in the near future. I appreciate very deeply the confidence and trust you have imposed in me.

The Honorable
Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy
Washington

Respectfully
/s/ J. M. McHugh
Lt. Colonel, USMC
Naval Attache and Naval Attache
for Air

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NOTE: This document contains information of a confidential nature and is to be handled accordingly.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

There is forwarded herewith as Enclosure "A" a copy of a letter addressed to The Honorable Wendell Willkie by Brigadier General C. L. Chennault, A.U.S., dated 8 October, 1942, which was prepared for Mr. Willkie at his request during his recent visit to Chungking after a conference with General Chennault. Due to a last minute change in departure the report did not reach Mr. Willkie in time and is being forwarded by the same mail which brings this report.

This letter explains at first hand and in much greater detail the argument which I advanced on page 3 of the report under reference for an immediate air offensive against Japan in China. It will be noted in fact that General Chennault asks for an even smaller air force than I advocated, namely, 100 fighters of modern design, 30 medium bombers and, in the last phase some months from now, 10 heavy bombers. He furthermore states that he can supply the above force with only 30 transports of the C-47 type now in use. His estimated requirements are appended in detail to his letter.

Because I believe his plan to be thoroughly practicable and furthermore am convinced that it is absolutely essential for us to take the offensive now in this theater, I am going to discuss it in plain language. I am going to call a spade a spade in this report and name individuals. I consider that my position as an independent observer from a different branch of the service entitles me to do so.

There is when General Chennault's plan may appeal (and I believe a decided majority will agree that it is worth trying) will at once ask, "Why then doesn't General Stilwell put it into operation?" It is a fair question. I have not even understood

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Distribution by Signal

Copy furnished to the JCS

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until I obtained an explanation from a reliable third party as to what I showed up estimate of October 24th. That individual, who had just recently conversed with General Chennault of the subject, quoted him directly as stating that the main objection to any increase of the air force in China was based on the belief that such increase as is practicable and feasible would still be so small as to mean nothing in the general picture of the conduct of this war. General Chennault understood such an increase only in terms of air transport, in the form of cargo and other, that is even if there were to be an increase of several million men in other words to have not even visualized the future that Chennault is going to the force advocated by General Chennault. It is a mistake to think that Chennault was advocating a large increase in the number of fighters. In all probability, the limited number of fighters (most of them had any prior experience in the Far East) that the limitations of present stocks of gasoline plus restricted transport make it wholly impossible to conduct offensive air operations until such time as a land route can be reopened.

These air officers, incidentally, have been trained in the "Flying Fortress" school. They think in terms of getting close. General Brett arrived in Burma and Chungking last December talking of nothing but four motorized planes. He was followed by General Brady who had rushed away from the H.M.I. to India looking for a place where he could pick the few remaining fortresses which had been caught flat-footed on the ground without protection of either warning net or fighters in the Philippines on the day war opened and had been on the run ever since. General Brady was followed closely by General Brewster and Haidem who, despite clear cut instructions to open and maintain a ferry route across India to China as their main objective, established themselves comfortably in a modern, air-conditioned hotel in New Delhi with female stenographers and began to stage sporadic raids into Burma and the Bay of Bengal with their few remaining fortresses to the tune of much publicity. They gave General Stilwell neither air support nor reconnaissance, incidentally, during the Battle of Burma. None of them ever indicated that he understood or appreciated the basic principle of air strategy long advocated by Chennault that one must first establish bases as far forward as possible protected by fighters and a warning and reporting net and take the war to the enemy from those bases. Yet Chennault was demonstrating this very thing right under their noses with his A.V.G., protecting Hanoi, Yunnan and Luochow and bombing and strafing the Japs in Thailand and Indochina. The Ferry Route to China, incidentally, was left largely to its own devices under the immediate control of combat pilots who possessed little if any experience in transport and supply organization and problems - this furthermore despite the availability of V. L. Reed and his China National Aviation Corporation who possessed both the experience and ability and could easily have been used as a nucleus for expansion to any proportions. The Army instead went into competition with C.N.A.C. and are now trying to short them through the device of chartering their capacity.

This condition obtained until early in July when, General Brewster having been transferred to Cairo and the

confusion in the 10th U. S. Air Force at New Delhi having become so serious as to demand action, General Stilwell relieved Brigadier General Haiden and appointed his own air staff officer, Brigadier General Miesel to the job. The Chinese, who had been saying that Chennault would be given complete control of air operations and who in the meantime had developed an active dislike of General Miesel, regarded this as a direct kick in the teeth. General Miesel had arrived in China in March along with General Stilwell, but it was soon apparent that he was General Arnold's man and that there were two parallel and almost independent lines of action - General Marshall to General Stilwell and General Arnold to General Miesel. General Stilwell exhibited a strange reticence from the first to interfere with or consult to his air officers. General Miesel set out immediately to force through the induction of the A.V.G. which had first been proposed in December. He dealt directly with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang on the subject and forced the issue on the argument that the A.V.G. could not hope to survive and obtain replacements in men and material as a mercenary organization while if it were inducted into the U. S. Army Air Force, he would see that it was well supplied. The Generalissimo acquiesced reluctantly, but with the proviso that Chennault should have control of operations in China. Chennault was promoted to Brigadier General and by a curious coincidence (?) his name went through just one number junior to that of General Miesel. This was no doubt due to the alphabetical arrangement of the list of nominees!

The induction was set for July 4th - a period which had in previous years been the height of the bombing season and with the morale of the Chinese already shaken over the loss of Burma. The great majority of the A.V.G. quit in disgust and with this apparent I personally interceded with General Stilwell to postpone the date and appeal to the A.V.G. to renew their contracts until the Fall. He finally extended it at the last moment to July 19th, but the damage was already done and most of the A.V.G. departed leaving an inexperienced group of new Army pilots to take over. Fortunately the Japs kept away and toward the end of the month Chennault had managed to send out several more promising Army pilots which he combined with the few A.V.G. remaining to stage his successful front line air offensives against Kunming, Kweichow and Canton during August.

In the meantime the change in command at New Delhi had occurred and Chennault found himself titularly in command of the "China Air Task Force", but administratively under General Miesel in New Delhi and with specific orders to escape any direct dealings with the Chinese, but instead to work through the chain of command - namely to Miesel over to Stilwell, back to Stilwell and then to the Generalissimo, or, to Stilwell, then to Miesel, back to Stilwell and then to Chennault before any move however small can be taken. He has, in other words, only local tactical command. He has no input over his supplies or replacements and must submit all operational plans as well as administrative questions through the chain of command. This is not what was promised the Generalissimo and I learned directly from him when I worked along with him and Madame Chiang on October 9th that he is exceedingly annoyed by it. He wants the India command

completely separated from the China command and he wants General Chennault in full control. He is very skeptical of receiving any of the planes now earmarked for the 10th Air Force to which I referred in my report of July 5th.

General Chennault informs me, incidentally, that the 10th Air Force is now bringing its 51st Fighter Group in India up to full strength (54 planes), that they plan to organize a second fighter group there and a medium bomber group of 48 B-25's plus the six B-24's and fifteen B-17's which they already have. He has also just learned that the British now have in India fifteen squadrons of fighters of 16 planes each - this apparently for the defense of India against a very problematical Japanese attack as opposed to the plan which Chennault advances for attacking the Japs now in China and making sure they never get to India! The excuse is that they are going to protect the India-China Ferry route. This is sound as far as it goes, but it should be coordinated in my opinion with Chennault's program in China, placed under his full control and definitely diverted from the protection of India proper. That is General Stilwell's job. It brings up the question of General Stilwell's plans.

General Stilwell wants to recapture Burma and the above concentration of the 10th Air Force is related also to this. This is an understandable and parsimonious ambition. He got kicked out of there in a very rude and unceremonious fashion. After all blame is laid and excuses made the fact remains that he permitted the Japs to draw him clear over to his right flank when he admittedly did not know of their rapid approach to his left flank and thereby not only was out-flanked, but actually cut off from his main line of withdrawal. One can argue and explain it until doomsday, but to get cut off from the rear has always been and always will be an unpardonable violation of the basic rules of military strategy. The subsequent retreat of himself and staff together with part of the Chinese forces into Assam was a flight - not a withdrawal or even a retreat.

I stated in my previous report that I do not consider the employment of American troops practicable in a campaign to recapture Burma. I happen to know that General Stilwell has asked for three divisions and that he considers this reasonable since it constituted only a small fraction of the force we are now training. But as I commented previously, the shipping required to deliver and to maintain three divisions would constitute a much larger fraction of our total. Operationally it would be very difficult. But most of all, and a point I did not mention previously, is the political angle. The British do not want either us or the Chinese participating in the recapture of Burma. They are afraid they would not get it back and there is no denying that the Chinese want both the oil and rice of Burma. General Stilwell is now training Chinese troops in India - the 38th Division and part of the 5th Division which finally struggled there from Burma. The excuse is plausible; they cannot bring them back to China; the heavy-load artillery and ammunition is on hand in India and likewise cannot be brought into China by air; so they can shoot and train to their heart's content in India and then take part in the recapture of Burma. Orders have just been issued, in fact, by General Stilwell's headquarters in China, indicating that all export

(of essential war materials such as tin and tungsten from India will be held in abeyance until further orders pending the transfer to India of more Chinese troops.

I doubt seriously if the British would really cooperate in a joint Sino-American-British campaign to recapture Burma. The Chinese, on the other hand, are enthusiastic about it and are anxious to reopen the supply route to China. They intend to stay in Burma if they can for reasons given above and to control the backdoor route all the way to the sea. They also like the Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" only they see themselves as the leaders instead of the Japanese. The British have long known and feared this and they stalled the completion of their part of the Burma Road as long as they could to discourage it. They likewise stalled the entrance of Chinese troops and declined the initial offer of Chinese troops for the same reason. They never anticipated that the Japanese would overrun it so fast.

I consider therefore that the present plans for the recapture of Burma and the accompanying dissipation of American Air Strength there to be essentially fallacious as opposed to its effective employment in the manner which General Chennault outlines. Let it be remembered that the Japanese take out from 10,000 to 14,000 tons daily of high grade coal alone from the Mongyai mines north of Hsiangshang and that these ships can be sunk by air operations from fields still in the possession of the Chinese. They also ship 200,000 tons of rice per season north. Let it also be remembered that the harbor of Hsiangshang is teeming with shipping. (A recent reconnaissance by Chennault proved this.) The destruction of Japanese shipping will do more to bring this war to a close than any other one factor. A well directed bombing attack on the power plants of the Kailan Mines at Tientsin, North of Tientsin, would put the mines out of action through flooding for at least a year and deprive the Japanese of over fifty percent (some say seventy-five) of their total supply of coking coal. I have personally obtained and given to Chennault a complete set of maps for this operation. He as yet has no planes with sufficient range for the job - yet the 10th Air Force has six B-24's and fifteen B-17's sitting down there doing comparatively little!

I firmly believe - and I report this without the slightest personal rancor or feeling, that the war in this theater would be materially aided by the removal of both Generals Stilwell and Henshaw and their huge staffs. These staffs alone are an object of amazement in the amount of paper work they engage in every day with so little real action resulting. They make their own work and I firmly believe they would be just as busy if they were suddenly transported to Kansas City as they now are here and with no appreciable change in the local situation. Chennault carried the A.V.C. through its entire career with practically no staff at all! The Chinese would be of two minds on the question, I believe. On the one hand they would fear a loss of face and of promised support, but I think this would be overcome if the action were passed to Chennault with tangible evidence of genuine support for him together with the relief

of being rid of the officers each of whom in his own way has irritated and annoyed them. Neither of the two Generals named has the confidence of the Chinese. Chennault, as I have said before, does have it and if we mean what we continually have promised them I believe we should take action accordingly. More than this, I repeat again, I firmly believe we could really begin to do tangible damage to the Japanese and severely compromise their present efforts.

J. M. McMEAM,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air.

ATTACHED "A" TO AIRPORT NO. 10/42 FROM NAVAL ATTACHE, CHINESE,
DATED 11 OCTOBER, 1942

HEADQUARTERS, CHINA AIR TASK FORCE
Office of the Commanding General

October 8, 1942.

Mr. Wendell Willkie,
Special Representative of the President
in his capacity as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces.

You have stated to me that you are the direct representative in a military as well as a political sense, of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army, the President of the United States. You have ordered me to make a report directly to you on military operations in China against Japan. I herewith comply.

1. Japan can be defeated in China.
2. It can be defeated by an Air Force so small that in other theaters it would be called ridiculous.
3. I am confident that, given real authority in command of such an Air Force, I can cause the collapse of Japan. I believe I can do it in such a manner that the lives of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and sailors will be saved, and that the cost to our country will be relatively small.
4. I speak with confidence, but, I believe, not with egotism. The reason for my confidence is based on the fact that since 1923 I have believed firmly in the possibility of Japan making war on the United States; I have devoted the best years of my military life to the study of this subject; I have for five years been unofficial advisor to the Chinese Air Force; in this capacity, I made war against Japan for over five years; for the last year I have commanded first the A.V.G., then the China Air Task Force; at no time in China have I had as many as fifty fighting planes in operation to meet the full fighting air force of Japan; as Commander of the A.V.G. and the China Air Task Force, I have never lost an air battle against the Japanese. This fighting fighter force under my command has destroyed over three hundred Japanese aircraft confirmed and about three hundred more, probably destroyed - I believe the total to be about six hundred - with the loss of twelve A.V.G. pilots and four China Air Task Force pilots from enemy action. The bomber force of the China Air Task Force has consisted of maximum of eight medium bombers. With these I have made twenty five raids against Japanese installations, troops, and shipping, without the loss of either a man or plane through enemy action.

5. When I came to China the Chinese Air Force was under Italian advisors. Before America entered the war I had succeeded, (because I believed we would fight the Axis powers and Japan), in having the Italians sent out of China. I believe I have the full confidence of the Generalissimo and all high Chinese leaders. If I have their confidence it is because (a) I have been a winning general, (b) I have never lied to the Chinese, and I have never promised to perform more than I believed capable of performance.

6. I am now confident that given full authority as the American military commander in China that I can not only bring about the downfall of Japan but that I can make the Chinese lasting friends with the United States. I am confident that I can create such good will that China will be a great and friendly trade market for generations.

7. The military task is a simple one. It has been complicated by unwieldy, illogical military organization and by men who do not understand aerial warfare in China.

8. To accomplish the downfall of Japan, I need only this very small American Air Force - 105 fighter aircraft of modern design, 30 medium bombers, and in the last phase, some months from now, 15 heavy bombers. The force must be constantly maintained at all times. We will have losses. These losses must be replaced. I consider 30 per cent replacements in fighters and 20 per cent in bombers sufficient.

9. My reason for stating that I can accomplish the overthrow of Japan is that I am confident this force can destroy the effectiveness of the Japanese Air Force, probably within six months, within one year at the outside. I am a professional fighter and this is my professional opinion. The facts on which this opinion is based are simple. Japan has only a limited production of aircraft. I can force that Japanese Air Force by aerial military maneuver to fight me in a position of my own selection. Having once fixed it in this position I can destroy it's effectiveness. With it's basic effective Air Force destroyed, our Navy can operate with freedom, and General MacArthur can push his offensive in the South West Pacific at will. Meanwhile, from the Eastern Chinese Air bases, I will guarantee to destroy the principal industrial centers of Japan. No country is so peculiarly vulnerable to air attack. The cutting of the Japanese sea routes to her newly conquered empire is a simple matter. Once the above two objectives are accomplished the complete military subjection of Japan is certain and easy.

10. To effectively maintain the small air force mentioned above, an aerial supply line must be built up between India and China. It is a simple statement of fact to say this aerial supply line will also be minute compared to the objectives to be accomplished. The full establishment and maintenance of this aerial ferry route is child's play in comparison with the difficulties overcome in establishing the Pan American Air Line or it's Atlantic and Pacific Air lines. It only needs good command - good management. The amount of freight to be carried over this air line in order to maintain an air force is very small - the accompanying study will state the basic simplicity.

11. The present plan for the defense of this ferry line is that of the standard orthodox, rigid military mind. It shows complete lack of conception of the true use of air power or even of basic military strategy. I would defend this air line in the same way that Scipio Africanus defended Rome, when Hannibal was at its very gates. Scipio struck at Carthage, and the Carthaginians, by necessity, had to call him and his army back to Africa to defend Carthage. In like manner, I would defend the ferry route by striking at the Japanese supply lines to the Southwest Pacific, and then hit Tokyo itself. The Japanese Air Force by necessity would then be forced to fight in Eastern China and over Tokyo. The Japanese have not the air power to fight both over the ferry route in India, Burma and Yunnan, and over Tokyo at the same time. No capable commander in history has ever adopted the rigid plan of the now present method considered of defending the ferry route. Grant ordered Sherman to march through the heart of the South and destroy Lee's supplies and cut Lee's lines of communications while, he, Grant, fixed Lee's Army in northern Virginia. Once Lee's supplies and line of communication were cut, Lee was defeated and the Confederacy was ruined. I plan to do the same thing in China against Japan with air power. Japan must hold ~~Hankow~~, Shanghai, and the Yangtze Valley. These are essential to hold Japan itself. I can force the Japanese Air Force to fight in the defense of these objectives behind the best air warning net of its kind in the Far East (which warning net I have spent five years in developing). With the use of these tactics, I am confident that I can destroy Japanese aircraft at the rate of between ten to twenty to one. When the Japanese Air Force refuses to come within my warning net and fight, I will strike out with my medium bombers against their sea supply line to the Southwest Pacific. In a few months the enemy will lose so many aircraft that the aerial defense of Japan will be negligible. I can then strike at Japan from Chusow (Chusan) and Lichai with heavy bombers. My air force can burn up Japan's two main industrial areas - Tokyo and the Kobe, Osaka, Nagoya triangle - and Japan will be unable to supply her armies in her newly conquered empire in China, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, etc. with munitions of war. The road is then open for the Chinese Army in China, for the American Navy in the Pacific and for MacArthur to advance from his Australian stronghold - all with comparatively slight cost.

12. While engaged in these operations, I will maintain full ground installations for the Eastern terminus of the ferry route in Yunnan, at Kunming, Chanyi, Yunnan, etc. If a really major swift aerial movement is made by the Japanese across their staging route into Burma, to attack the India-China air supply lines, then, acting on interior lines of air communications, I can move back and again be within the warning net which I have established in Yunnan, and meet the Japanese over their Burma airfields and then and there destroy whatever force they have sent against us.

My entire above plan is simple. It has been long thought out. I have spent five years developing an air warning net and radio command service to fight this way. I have no doubt of my success.

SECRET

13. However, in order to accomplish this aim, it is essential that I be given complete freedom of fighting action, that I also be able to deal directly with the Generalissimo and the Chinese forces. This latter I know the Generalissimo desires. I would not make the above statements so confidently if I had not, in my operations with the A.V.G., never retreated one foot until the ground forces had fled behind me, leaving up air bases exposed to ground attack. Only then did I retreat to again destroy twenty Japanese planes for each one of the A.V.G. lost. Even then I would not have been forced to retreat if I had had the necessary bombers and reconnaissance planes.

Given authority to report only to the Generalissimo, I intend to carry out in China this combined ground and air action.

14. This plan I again repeat will enable the Chinese ground forces to operate successfully, and must assuredly will permit them to successfully advance and will decisively aid the Navy's operations in the Pacific. Moreover, it will make China our lasting friend for years after the war.

15. Reference to attached map will clearly indicate operating areas and striking distances of vital Japanese communications from our air bases. Attached is an outline of operations and logistics.

U. L. GUMMEL
Brigadier General, A.U.S.,
Commanding.

SECRET**REORGANIZATION, CHINA AIR TASK FORCE****MAIN OBJECTIVES****Objectives:**

1. Primary movement of vital supplies by air from Hsinan to Kiating.
2. Secondary movement of supplies to forward areas by truck and railway.
3. Operations against Chinese tactical objectives by medium bombardment and fighters from bases in the Hsinan-Kiating area.
4. Improving and conditioning our winning act in forward areas.

Subsistence items for personnel will be obtained in China as far as possible.

Squadrons will be stream lined for field mobility, using to the fullest the Chinese Air Force crews which are available to us for field salvage and routine service and using entirely Chinese services which are established and satisfactory for messing and quartering facilities.

Combat equipment strength:

1. Two single engine Fighter Group plus one Squadron, total 100 airplanes
2. One Medium Bombardment Group consisting of two Squadrons, total 30 airplanes.

Figures based upon past operations in this theater indicate that Fighter Squadron strength should be maintained at

Indian Bombardment Squadron strength	100 officers and men
This will bring the total combat strength of U.S. Forces in China to	100 officers and men
Service and personnel necessary for	612 officers and men
Quarters	200 officers and men
Total army personnel in China for this phase of operations	1,000 officers and men.

Operations in this theater indicate that Fighter Squadrons assigned 25 airplanes at the first of each month and maintain an average of 15 airplanes on the alert each day throughout that month. Medium Bombardment Squadrons maintain 10 airplanes at the beginning of each month on the alert and 5 airplanes on the alert each day throughout that month. For an extended period of time, the plan will require the replacement of bombardment airplanes and 100 fighters and 100 airplanes and reasonable supply of spare parts and maintenance equipment delivered to the operating units for this phase of operations.

Operations indicate that medium field performance can be maintained for 100 fighters and 100 medium bombardment airplanes.

average gasoline consumption per fighter is 100 gallons per operating day - to all fighter airplane requirements - 144,000 gallons per month. Gasoline requirement medium bombardment airplanes per operating day 300 gallons - total medium bombardment requirements 180,000 gallons monthly. Two transports will be necessary for secondary supply to Squadrons operating at advanced bases. These transports will have an average of 20 operating days per month, gasoline consumption of two transports per month estimated at 30,000 gallons - total aviation gasoline consumption China Air Task Force 344,000 gallons monthly.

Total airplane engine oil requirements - 6,000 gallons per month.

Due to weather conditions and tactical considerations, it is barely possible that 20 operating days per month will be maintained throughout the length of time in which operations are contemplated.

Ordinance requirements - 432,000 rounds 30 caliber ammunition per month. At the present time supplies of 30 and 30 caliber ammunition on hand in China will more than meet the requirements of both fighter and bombardment groups.

Ordinance requirements Bombardment Squadrons - 720,000 pounds per month. At the present time adequate bombs are on hand in this area to supply this phase of operation.

Monthly tonnage list of supplies necessary to support first phase of operation:

100 Octane Aviation Fuel	1,014 tons
Air Force Supplies consisting of parts and maintenance materials	20 tons
Motor Vehicle Fuel for field operations	60 tons
Special subsistence items and GI items	20 tons
Post Exchange Supplies	4 tons
Chemical Warfare Supplies	4 tons
Engineering Corps supplies	2 tons
Signal Supplies	2 tons
Medical Supplies	3 tons
Machine gun ammunition	10 tons
Bombs	20 tons
Miscellaneous ordinance	4 tons
Miscellaneous items	7 tons
Total monthly tonnage	1,200

C-47 type transports can make an estimate of 20 round trips per month carrying two tons cargo each trip. Thirty transports maintained in commission at all times, will be the minimum requirements for air supply of the China Air Task Force.

This plan does not include motor vehicle fuel for secondary movement of supplies from Kunning to rail head of the Kunming-Singhai Railway or from this point to more advanced depots. Fuel for this move is available at this time in China.

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PHASE "B" ASSUMED THREAT MOVEMENT**Objectives:**

1. Maintenance of objectives attained in Phase "A".
2. Operations from most advanced airbases with fighters and medium bombardment type aircraft.

Relative weakening of the Japanese Air Force in this area by forcing the Japanese to concentrate on our bases and to meet American pursuit over Chinese warning net.

Logistical increases second phase of operations:

Ordinance supplies	240 tons
Motor fuel for secondary transport of supplies	120 tons
	200 tons

Require additional transports needed to carry this increased tonnage for second phase of operations.

Supplementing above, India China Supply service with 10 four engine transports of the C-47 or C-54 types. These airplanes will be used to bring in material for spotting supplies at most advanced bases for operation of heavy bombers against the island of Japan.

Primary movement of these supplies to be from Dinjon to Kunming. Secondary movement to frontal areas by transportation now available in China. If it is impossible to do this because of lack of facilities, primary movement of supply will be made from Dinjon to airports on the Kweichow-Szechwan Railway and from this point distributed by rail and by truck to forward airbases.

Logistic figures are based on the assumption that transport material will be maintained at 47 C-47 type and 20 4-engine types with an average of 20 operating days per month during this second phase of operation.

PHASE "C"

1. Continued operations of light bombardment and pursuit as outlined in Phase "A" and Phase "B".
2. Use of the advanced airbases for operation of heavy bombardment squadrons against Japan. Active pursuit operations over and from advanced bases to protect these installations from Japanese attacks.

Logistics as outlined in Phase "B", supplemented by two additional 4 engine transports for initial and secondary support of heavy bombardment squadrons operating against Japan.

Total transportation aircraft for this phase and succeeding operations:

47 C-47 types
20 four engine types

To adequately supply field units it is necessary
that replacement transports be available to maintain the
above number in commission at all times.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Monograph Index Guide No. _____
(To correspond with monograph given below. See G. H. & Index Guide.
This number refers to each table only.)

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DECLASSIFICATION AND DOWNGRADING OF INFORMATION IN CHINA DATED 8 OCTOBER, 1992

There is forwarded herewith as Enclosure "A" a copy of a letter addressed to The Honorable Wendell Willkie by Brigadier General G. L. Chambliss, A.U.S., dated 8 October, 1942, which was prepared for Mr. Willkie at his request during his recent visit to Washington after a conference with General Chambliss. Due to a last minute change in departure the report did not reach Mr. Willkie in time and is being forwarded by the same mail which brings this report.

This letter explains at ~~length~~ hand and in much greater detail the argument which I advanced on page 3 of the report under reference for an immediate air offensive against Japan in China. It will be noted in fact that General Chennault asks for an even smaller air force than I advocated, namely, 103 fighters of modern design, 30 medium bombers and, in the last phase some months from now, 12 heavy bombers. He furthermore states that he can supply the above force with only 36 transports of the C-47 type now in use. His estimated requirements are appended in detail to his letter.

Because I believe his plan to be thoroughly practicable and furthermore am convinced that it is absolutely essential for us to take the offensive now in this theater, I am going to discuss it in plain language. I am going to call a spade a spade in this report and name individuals. I consider that my position as an independent observer from a different branch of the service enables me to do so.

There to them General Stewart's plan may appeal (and I believe a decided majority will agree that it is worth trying) will at once ask, "Why then doesn't General Stewart put it into execution?" It is a fair question. I have not even understood

— 100 —

SECRET

myself until I obtained an explanation from a reliable third party to whom I showed my estimate of October 3th. That individual, who had just recently conversed with General Stilwell on the subject, quoted him directly as stating that his main objection to any increase of the air force in China was based on his belief that such increase as is practicable and feasible "would still be as small as to mean nothing in the general picture of the conduct of this war". General Stilwell understands such an increase only in terms of air power in the Chinese medium and added, "what is even a medium plane for a Chinese army of several million men?" In other words he does not even visualize the danger that can be done to Burma by the force advocated by General Chennault who has already been demonstrated during July and August of 1942. He has furthermore been convinced by his military air staff (none of whom had any prior experience in the Far East) that the limitations of present stocks of gasoline plus restricted transport make it wholly impossible to consider offensive air operations until such time as a land route can be reopened.

These air officers, incidentally, have been trained in the "Flying Fortress" school. They think in terms of nothing else. General Brett arrived in Burma and Chungking last December talking of nothing but four motored planes. He was followed by General Brady who had rushed away from the U.S.I. to India looking for a place where he could park the few remaining fortresses which had been caught flat-footed on the ground without protection of either warning net or fighters in the Philippines on the day war opened and had been on the run ever since. General Brady was followed quickly by Generals Brewster and Halden who, despite clear cut instructions to open and maintain a ferry route across India to China as their main objective, established themselves comfortably in a modern, air-conditioned hotel in New Delhi with female stenographers and began to stage sporadic raids into Burma and the Bay of Bengal with their few remaining fortresses to the tune of much publicity. They gave General Stilwell neither air support nor reconnaissance, incidentally, during the Battle of Burma. None of them ever indicated that he understood or appreciated the basic principle of air strategy long advocated by Chennault that one must first establish bases as far forward as possible protected by fighters and a warning and reporting net and take the war to the enemy from these bases. Yet Chennault was demonstrating this very thing right under their noses with his A.V.U., protecting Mangan, Younge and Lashio and bombing and strafing the Japs in Thailand and Indochina! The Ferry Route to China, incidentally, was left largely to its own devices under the immediate control of combat pilots who possessed little if any experience in transport and supply organization and problems - this furthermore despite the availability of A. L. Mond and his China National Aviation Corporation who possessed both the experience and ability and could easily have been used as a nucleus for expansion to any proportions. The Army instead went into competition with C.N.A.C. and are now trying to absorb them through the device of chartering their capacity.

This condition obtained until early in July when, General Brewster having been transferred to Cairo and the

confusion in the 10th U. S. Air Force at New Delhi having become so notorious as to demand action, General Stilwell relieved Brigadier General Halden and appointed his own air staff officer, Brigadier General Miesel to the job. The Chinese, who had been hoping that Chennault would be given complete control of air operations and who in the meantime had developed an active dislike of General Miesel, regarded this as a direct kick in the teeth. General Miesel had arrived in China in March along with General Stilwell, but it was soon apparent that he was General Arnold's man and that there were two parallel and almost independent lines of action - General Marshall to General Stilwell and General Arnold to General Miesel. General Stilwell exhibited a strange reticence from the first to interfere with or dictate to his air officers. General Miesel set out immediately to force through the induction of the A.V.O. which had first been proposed in December. He dealt directly with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang on the subject and forced the issue on the argument that the A.V.O. could not hope to survive and obtain replacements in men and material as a mercenary organization while if it were inducted into the U. S. Army Air Force, he would see that it was well supplied. The Generalissimo acquiesced reluctantly, but with the proviso that Chennault should have control of operations in China. Chennault was promoted to Brigadier General and by a curious coincidence (?) his name went through just one number junior to that of General Miesel. This was no doubt due to the alphabetical arrangement of the list of nominees!

The induction was set for July 15th - a period which had in previous years been the height of the bombing season and with the morale of the Chinese already shaken over the loss of Burma. The great majority of the A.V.O. quit in disgust and with this apparent I personally interceded with General Stilwell to postpone the date and appeal to the A.V.O. to renew their contracts until the Fall. He finally extended it at the last moment to July 19th, but the damage was already done and most of the A.V.O. departed leaving an inexperienced group of new Army pilots to take over. Fortunately the Japs kept away and toward the end of the month Chennault had managed to send out several more promising Army pilots which he combined with the few A.V.O. remaining to stage his successful front line air offensives against Hankow, Szechang and Canton during August.

In the meantime the change in command at New Delhi had occurred and Chennault found himself titularly in command of the "China Air Task Force", but administratively under General Miesel in New Delhi and with specific orders to cease any direct dealings with the Chinese, but instead to deal through the chain of command - namely to Miesel over in India, back to Stilwell and then to the Generalissimo, or, to Stilwell, then to Miesel, back to Stilwell and then to Chennault before any move however small can be taken. He has, in other words, only local tactical command. He has no control over his supplies or replacements and must submit all strategical plans as well as administrative questions through the chain of command. This is not what was promised the Generalissimo and I learned directly from him when I worked along with him and Madame Chiang on October 9th that he is exceedingly annoyed by it. He wants the India command

completely separated from the China command and he wants General Chennault in full control. He is very skeptical of receiving any of the planes now earmarked for the 10th Air Force to which I referred in my report of July 5th.

General Chennault informs me, incidentally, that the 10th Air Force is now bringing its 51st Fighter Group in India up to full strength (54 planes), that they plan to organize a second fighter group there and a medium bomber group of 14 B-25's plus the six B-24's and fifteen B-17's which they already have. He has also just learned that the British now have in India fifteen squadrons of fighters of 16 planes each - this apparently for the defense of India against a very problematical Japanese attack as opposed to the plan which Chennault advances for attacking the Japs now in China and making sure they never get to India! The excuse is that they are going to protect the India-China Ferry route. This is sound as far as it goes, but it should be coordinated in my opinion with Chennault's program in China, placed under his full control and definitely divorced from the protection of India proper. That is General Savell's job. It brings up the question of General Stilwell's plans.

General Stilwell wants to recapture Burma and the above concentration of the 10th Air Force is related also to this. This is an understandable and pardonable ambition! He got kicked out of there in a very rude and unceremonious fashion. After all blame is laid and excuses made the fact remains that he permitted the Japs to draw him clear over to his right flank when he admittedly did not know of their rapid approach to his left flank and thereby not only was out-flanked, but actually cut off from his main line of withdrawal. One can argue and explain it until doomsday, but to get cut off from the rear has always been and always will be an unpardonable violation of the basic rules of military strategy. The subsequent retreat of himself and staff together with part of the Chinese forces into Assam was a flight - not a withdrawal or even a retreat.

I stated in my previous report that I do not consider the employment of American troops practicable in a campaign to recapture Burma. I happen to know that General Stilwell has asked for three divisions and that he considers this reasonable since it constituted only a small fraction of the force we are now training. But as I commented previously, the shipping required to deliver and to maintain three divisions would constitute a much larger fraction of our total. Logistically it would be very difficult. But most of all, and a point I did not mention previously, is the political angle. The British do not want either us or the Chinese participating in the recapture of Burma. They are afraid they would not get it back and there is no denying that the Chinese want both the oil and rice of Burma. General Stilwell is now training Chinese troops in India - the 38th Division and part of the 5th Division which finally struggled there from Burma. The excuse is plausible; they cannot bring them back to China; the Lend-Lease artillery and ammunition is on hand in India and likewise cannot be brought into China by air; so they can shoot and train to their heart's content in India and then take part in the recapture of Burma. Orders have just been issued, in fact, by General Stilwell's headquarters in Chungking that all export

of essential war materials such as tin and tungsten from China will be held in abeyance until further orders pending the transfer to India of more Chinese troops.

I doubt seriously if the British would really cooperate in a joint Sino-American-British campaign to recapture Burma. The Chinese, on the other hand, are enthusiastic about it and not alone to reopen the supply route to China. They intend to stay in Burma if they can for reasons given above and to control their backdoor route all the way to the sea. They also like the Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" only they see themselves as the leaders instead of the Japanese. The British have long known and feared this and they stalled the completion of their part of the Burma Road as long as they could to discourage it. They likewise stalled the defense of Burma proper and declined the initial offer of Chinese troops for the same reason. They never anticipated that the Japanese would overrun it so fast.

I consider therefore that the present plans for the recapture of Burma and the accompanying dissipation of American Air Strength there to be essentially fallacious as opposed to its effective employment in the manner which General Chennault outlines. Let it be remembered that the Japanese take out from 10,000 to 14,000 tons daily of high grade coal alone from the Hwangpoo mines north of Hsiphong and that these ships can be sunk by air operations from fields still in the possession of the Chinese. They also ship 200,000 tons of rice per season north. Let it also be remembered that the harbor of Hongkong is teeming with shipping. (A recent reconnaissance by Chennault proved this.) The destruction of Japanese shipping will do more to bring this war to a close than any other one factor. A well directed bombing attack on the power plants of the Kailan Mines at Tongshan, North of Tientsin, would put the mines out of action through flooding for at least a year and deprive the Japanese of over fifty percent (some say seventy-five) of their total supply of coking coal. I have personally obtained and given to Chennault a complete set of maps for this operation. He as yet has no planes with sufficient range for the job - yet the 10th Air Force has six B-24's and fifteen B-17's sitting down there doing comparatively little!

I firmly believe - and I report this without the slightest personal rancor or feeling, that the war in this theater would be materially aided by the removal of both Generals Stilwell and MacArthur and their huge staffs. These staffs alone are an object of amazement in the amount of paper work they engage in every day with so little real action resulting. They make their own work and I firmly believe they would be just as busy if they were suddenly transported to Kansas City as they now are here and with no appreciable change in the local situation. Chennault carried the A.B.C. through its entire career with practically no staff at all! The Chinese would be of two minds on the question, I believe. On the one hand they would fear a loss of face and of promised support, but I think this would be overcome if the action were backed to Chennault with tangible evidence of genuine support for him together with the relief

of being rid of two officers each of whom in his own way has irritated and annoyed them. Neither of the two Generals named has the confidence of the Chinese. Chennault, as I have said before, does have it and if we mean what we continually have promised them I believe we should take action accordingly. More than this, I repeat again, I firmly believe we could really begin to do tangible damage to the Japanese and severely compromise their present efforts.

J. M. McRUM,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air.

REPORT NO. 10/12 FROM NAVAL ATTACHE, CHENGKING,
DATED 11 OCTOBER, 1942

HEADQUARTERS, CHINA AIR TASK FORCE
Office of the Commanding General

October 8, 1942.

Mr. Wendell Willkie,
Special Representative of the President
in his capacity as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces.

You have stated to me that you are the direct representative in a military as well as a political sense, of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army, the President of the United States. You have ordered me to make a report directly to you on military operations in China against Japan. I herewith comply.

1. Japan can be defeated in China.
2. It can be defeated by an Air Force so small that in other theaters it would be called ridiculous.
3. I am confident that, given real authority in command of such an Air Force, I can cause the collapse of Japan. I believe I can do it in such a manner that the lives of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and sailors will be saved, and that the cost to our country will be relatively small.
4. I speak with confidence, but, I believe, not with egotism. The reason for my confidence is based on the fact that since 1923 I have believed firmly in the possibility of Japan making war on the United States; I have devoted the best years of my military life to the study of this subject; I have for five years been unofficial advisor to the Chinese Air Force; in this capacity, I made war against Japan for over five years; for the last year I have commanded first the A.V.O., then the China Air Task Force; at no time in China have I had as many as fifty fighting planes in operation to meet the full fighting air force of Japan; as Commander of the A.V.O. and the China Air Task Force, I have never lost an air battle against the Japanese. This tiny fighter force under my command has destroyed over three hundred Japanese aircraft confirmed and about three hundred more probably destroyed - I believe the total to be about six hundred - with the loss of twelve A.V.O. pilots and four China Air Task Force pilots from enemy action. The bomber force of the China Air Task Force has consisted of maximum of eight medium bombers. With these I have made twenty five raids against Japanese installations, troops, and shipping, without the loss of either a man or plane through enemy action.

SECRET

5. When I came to China the Chinese Air Force was under Italian advisers. Before America entered the war I had succeeded, (because I believed we would fight the Axis powers and Japan), in having the Italians sent out of China. I believe I have the full confidence of the Generalissimo and all high Chinese leaders. If I have their confidence it is because (a) I have been a winning general, (b) I have never lied to the Chinese, and I have never promised to perform more than I believed capable of performance.

6. I am now confident that given full authority as the American military commander in China that I can not only bring about the downfall of Japan but that I can make the Chinese lasting friends with the United States. I am confident that I can create such good will that China will be a great and friendly trade market for generations.

7. The military task is a simple one. It has been complicated by untidy, illogical military organization and by men who do not understand aerial warfare in China.

8. To accomplish the downfall of Japan, I need only this very small American Air Force - 105 fighter aircraft of modern design, 30 medium bombers, and in the last phase, some months from now, 12 heavy bombers. The force must be constantly maintained at all times. We will have losses. These losses must be replaced. I consider 30 per cent replacements in fighters and 20 per cent in bombers sufficient.

9. My reason for stating that I can accomplish the overthrow of Japan is that I am confident this force can destroy the effectiveness of the Japanese Air Force, probably within six months, within one year at the outside. I am a professional fighter and this is my professional opinion. The facts on which this opinion is based are simple. Japan has only a limited production of aircraft. I can force that Japanese Air Force by aerial military maneuver to fight me in a position of my own selection. Having once fixed it in this position I can destroy its effectiveness. With its basic effective Air Force destroyed, our Navy can operate with freedom, and General MacArthur can push his offensive in the South West Pacific as will. Meanwhile, from the Eastern Chinese Air Bases, I will guarantee to destroy the principal industrial centers of Japan. No country is so peculiarly vulnerable to air attack. The cutting of the Japanese sea routes to her newly conquered empire is a simple matter. Once the above two objectives are accomplished the complete military subjection of Japan is certain and easy.

10. To effectively maintain the small air force mentioned above, an aerial supply line must be built up between India and China. It is a simple statement of fact to say this aerial supply line will also be minute compared to the objectives to be accomplished. The full establishment and maintenance of this aerial ferry route is child's play in comparison with the difficulties overcome in establishing the Pan American Air Line or its Atlantic and Pacific Air Lines. It only needs good command - good management. The amount of freight to be carried over this air line in order to maintain an air force is very small - the accompanying study will state the basic simplicity.

SECRET

11. The present plan for the defense of this ferry line is that of the standard orthodox, rigid military mind. It shows complete lack of conception of the true use of air power or even of basic military strategy. I would defend this air line in the same way that Scipio Africanus defeated Hannibal, when Hannibal was at its very gates. Scipio struck at Carthage, and the Carthaginians, by necessity, had to call him and his army back to Africa to defend Carthage. In like manner, I would defend the ferry route by striking at the Japanese supply lines to the Southwest Pacific, and then hit Tokyo itself. The Japanese Air Force by necessity would then be forced to fight in eastern China and over Tokyo. The Japanese have not the air power to fight both over the ferry route in Hainan, Suva and Funan, and over Tokyo at the same time. No capable commander in history has ever adopted the stupid plan of the now present method considered of defending the ferry route. Grant ordered Sherman to march through the heart of the South and destroy Lee's supplies and cut Lee's lines of communications while, he, Grant, fixed Lee's Army in northern Virginia. Once Lee's supplies and line of communication were cut, Lee was defeated and the Confederacy was ruined. I plan to do the same thing in China against Japan with air power. Japan must hold Hongkong, Shanghai, and the Yangtze Valley. These are essential to hold Japan itself. I can force the Japanese Air Force to fight in the defense of these objectives behind the best air warning net of its kind in the Far East (which warning net I have spent five years in developing). With the use of these tactics, I am confident that I can destroy Japanese aircraft at the rate of between ten to twenty to one. When the Japanese Air Force refuses to come within my warning net and fight, I will strike out with my medium bombers against their sea supply line to the Southwest Pacific. In a few months the enemy will lose so many aircraft that the aerial defense of Japan will be negligible. I can then strike at Japan from Chuchow (Chusan) and Lichai with heavy bombers. My air force can burn up Japan's two main industrial areas - Tokyo and the Kobe, Osaka, Nagoya triangle - and Japan will be unable to supply her armies in her newly conquered empire in China, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, etc. with munitions of war. The road is then open for the Chinese Army in China, for the American Navy in the Pacific and for MacArthur to advance from his Australian stronghold - all with comparatively slight cost.

12. While engaged in these operations, I will maintain full ground installations for the Eastern terminus of the ferry route in Yunnan, at Kunming, Chanyi, Yunnanpi, etc. If a really major swift aerial movement is made by the Japanese across their staging route into Burma, to attack the India-China air supply lines, then, acting on interior lines of air communications, I can move back and again be within the warning net which I have established in Yunnan, and meet the Japanese over their Burma airfields and then and there destroy whatever force they have sent against us.

My entire above plan is simple. It has been long thought out. I have spent five years developing an air warning net and radio command service to fight this way. I have no doubt of my success.

completely separated from the China command and he wants General Chennault in full control. He is very skeptical of receiving any of the planes now earmarked for the 10th Air Force to which I referred in my report of July 5th.

General Chennault informs me, incidentally, that the 10th Air Force is now bringing its 51st Fighter Group in India up to full strength (54 planes), that they plan to organize a second fighter group there and a medium bomber group of 48 B-25's plus the six B-24's and fifteen B-17's which they already have. He has also just learned that the British now have in India fifteen squadrons of fighters of 16 planes each - this apparently for the defense of India against a very problematical Japanese attack as opposed to the plan which Chennault advances for attacking the Japs now in China and making sure they never get to India! The excuse is that they are going to protect the India-China Ferry route. This is sound as far as it goes, but it should be coordinated in my opinion with Chennault's program in China, placed under his full control and definitely divorced from the protection of India proper. That is General Macell's job. It brings up the question of General Stilwell's plans.

General Stilwell wants to recapture Burma and the above concentration of the 10th Air Force is related also to this. This is an understandable and pardonable ambition! He got kicked out of there in a very rude and unceremonious fashion. After all blame is laid and excuses made the fact remains that he permitted the Japs to draw him clear over to his right flank when he admittedly did not know of their rapid approach to his left flank and thereby not only was out-flanked, but actually cut off from his main line of withdrawal. One can argue and explain it until doomsday, but to get cut off from the rear has always been and always will be an unpardonable violation of the basic rules of military strategy. The subsequent retreat of himself and staff together with part of the Chinese forces into Assam was a flight - not a withdrawal or even a retreat.

I stated in my previous report that I do not consider the employment of American troops practicable in a campaign to recapture Burma. I happen to know that General Stilwell has asked for three divisions and that he considers this reasonable since it constituted only a small fraction of the force we are now training. But as I commented previously the shipping required to deliver and to maintain three divisions would constitute a much larger fraction of our total. Ultimately it would be very difficult. But most of all, and a point I did not mention previously, is the political angle. The British do not want either us or the Chinese participating in the recapture of Burma. They are afraid they would not get it back and there is no denying that the Chinese want both the oil and rice of Burma. General Stilwell is now training Chinese troops in India - the 38th Division and part of the 5th Division which finally struggled there from Burma. The excuse is plausible; they cannot bring them back to China; the heavy-load artillery and ammunition is on hand in India and likewise cannot be brought into China by air; so they can shoot and train to their heart's content in India and then take part in the recapture of Burma. Orders have just been issued, in fact, by General Stilwell's headquarters in Chungking that all export

SECRET

of essential war materials such as tin and tungsten from China will be held in abeyance until further orders pending the transfer to India of more Chinese troops.

I doubt seriously if the British would really cooperate in a joint Sino-American-British campaign to recapture Burma. The Chinese, on the other hand, are enthusiastic about it and not alone to reopen the supply route to China. They intend to stay in Burma if they can for reasons given above and to control their backdoor route all the way to the sea. They also like the Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" only they see themselves as the leaders instead of the Japanese. The British have long known and feared this and they stalled the completion of their part of the Burma Road as long as they could to discourage it. They likewise stalled the defense of Burma proper and declined the initial offer of Chinese troops for the same reason. They never anticipated that the Japanese would overrun it so fast.

I consider therefore that the present plans for the recapture of Burma and the accompanying dissipation of American Air Strength there to be essentially fallacious as opposed to its effective employment in the manner which General Chennault outlines. Let it be remembered that the Japanese take out from 10,000 to 14,000 tons daily of high grade coal alone from the Mongyai mines north of Huihong and that these ships can be sunk by air operations from fields still in the possession of the Chinese. They also ship 200,000 tons of rice per season north. Let it also be remembered that the harbor of Hongkong is teeming with shipping. (A recent reconnaissance by Chennault proved this.) The destruction of Japanese shipping will do more to bring this war to a close than any other one factor. A well directed bombing attack on the power plants of the Kailan Mines at Tsingshan, North of Tientsin, would put the mines out of action through flooding for at least a year and deprive the Japanese of over fifty percent (some say seventy-five) of their total supply of coking coal. I have personally obtained and given to Chennault a complete set of maps for this operation. He as yet has no planes with sufficient range for the job - yet the 10th Air Force has six B-24's and fifteen B-17's sitting down there doing comparatively little!

I firmly believe - and I report this without the slightest personal rancor or feeling, that the war in this theater would be materially aided by the removal of both Generals Stilwell and Hissell and their huge staffs. These staffs alone are an object of amazement in the amount of paper work they engage in every day with so little real action resulting. They make their own work and I firmly believe they would be just as busy if they were suddenly transported to Kansas City as they now are here and with no appreciable change in the local situation. Chennault carried the A.C.F. through its entire career with practically no staff at all! The Chinese would be of two minds on the question, I believe. On the one hand they would fear a loss of face and of promised support, but I think this would be overcome if the matter were passed to Chennault with tangible evidence of genuine support for him together with the relief

of being rid of two officers each of whom in his own way has irritated and annoyed them. Neither of the two Generals named has the confidence of the Chinese. Chenault, as I have said before, does have it and if we mean what we continually have promised them I believe we should take action accordingly. More than this, I repeat again, I firmly believe we could really begin to do tangible damage to the Japanese and severely compromise their present efforts.

J. M. MANDUM,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air.

SECRET

PHASE "B" SECOND PHASE OPERATIONS**Objectives:**

1. Maintenance of objectives attained in Phase "A".
2. Operations from most advanced airbases with fighters and medium bombardment type aircraft.

Positive weakening of the Japanese Air Force in this area by forcing the Japanese to concentrate on our bases and to meet American Pursuit over Chinese warning net.

Logistical increases second phase of operations:

Ordinance supplies	540 tons
Motor fuel for secondary transport of supplies	100 tons
	200 tons

Seventeen additional transports needed to carry this increased tonnage for second phase of operations.

Supplementing above, India China Supply service with 10 four engine transports of the C-57 or C-54 types. These airplanes will be used to bring in material for spotting supplies at most advanced bases for operation of heavy bombers against the island of Japan.

Primary movement of these supplies to be from Dinjan to Kunming. Secondary movement to frontal areas by transportation now available in China. If it is impossible to do this because of lack of facilities, primary movement of supply will be made from Dinjan to airports on the Kunming-Kweichow Railway and from this point distributed by rail and by truck to forward airbases.

Logistic figures are based on the assumption that transport material will be maintained at 47 C-47 type and 10 4-engine types with an average of 30 operating days per month during this second phase of operation.

PHASE "C"

1. Continued operations of light bombardment and pursuit as outlined in Phase "A" and Phase "B".
2. Use of the advanced airbases for operation of heavy bombardment squadrons against Japan. Active pursuit operations over and from advanced bases to protect these installations from Japanese attacks.

Logistics as outlined in Phase "B", supplemented by two additional 4 engine transports for initial and secondary supply of heavy bombardment squadrons operating against Japan.

Total transportation aircraft for this phase and succeeding operations:

47 C-47 types
20 Four engine types

To adequately supply field units it is necessary that replacement transports be available to maintain the above number in commission at all times.